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	It has been claimed that Thomas Aquinas’s view of akrasia (also referred to as “incontinence”) is best discerned by focusing on the relevant discussions in his theological texts: Summa Theologica (ST) Ia-IIae, q.77, De Malo (DM) q.3, a.9, and to a lesser extent ST IIa-IIae, q.156.​[1]​ In contrast, his discussion of Aristotle’s akratic in Sententia Libri Ethicorum (SLE), his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (EN), is sometimes dismissed as being less interesting since it (so it is claimed) basically follows Aristotle’s own discussion.​[2]​ If we carefully compare the SLE discussion to his theological texts, we will notice some remarkable differences with regard to syllogistic reasoning, heretofore inadequately discussed, between the two treatments. At first glance, the presence of such differences appears to support the claim that in SLE Aquinas is not necessarily offering his own views but rather simply following Aristotle’s discussion. A closer examination, however, will demonstrate that there are rationales (many of which are linked) for the presence of such differences; they are not necessarily a result of Aquinas “simply” following Aristotle in SLE while offering his own view in the theological works. There will thus be support for claiming that SLE’s treatment is consistent with that in the theological works. This may, in turn, suggest that we consult (or at least not necessarily rule out consulting) SLE in order to have a complete understanding of Aquinas’s view on akrasia.​[3]​
	Part I will accomplish two tasks. It begins by focusing on the fact that Aquinas uses what I call a “complexified” prohibitive universal premise in SLE but not in the theological works. From that difference two further divergences between the two treatments are derived. A rationale for all three of these differences is then explored. This rationale is subsequently shown to be crucial in explaining yet another key difference between the two treatments: the phrasing of the permissive syllogism as non-imperative in SLE but imperative in the theological works. In Part II, we will focus on how his assumption that both universal premises are “used” in the SLE can be consistent with his statement in the theological works that akrasia can sometimes be explained by a failure to “use” the universal premise. Having both resolved this discrepancy and argued for the consistency of SLE with the theological texts, we will conclude with the suggestion that Aquinas’s akratic arrives at the conclusion of the prohibitive syllogism--a suggestion that is somewhat surprising since it is opposed to the way in which Aristotle’s understanding of akrasia is typically explained.​[4]​
Part I: 
	The first difference between the two treatments is the form of the prohibitive universal premises involved in the akratic’s practical reasoning. As is well known, Aristotle explains akrasia by appealing to competing practical syllogisms: a prohibitive one that, if successful, results in the agent acting correctly, and a permissive one that, if successful, ends with the agent acting akratically. For a particular syllogism to be successful, moreover, each of the premises in that syllogism must not only be known, but in some sense be “known and used.”​[5]​ It is not enough that a premise be merely habitually known in the recesses of the agent’s mind. Rather, the premises must in some way be “active” for the agent such that the agent is reflecting upon and thus “using” the knowledge expressed by that premise. (“Active” and “used,” when referring to propositions​[6]​, are thus to be understood synonymously.) Those premises which are either not known at all, or known only in some habitual way, are “inactive” and “unused” or known merely “habitually.” (These terms will likewise be used synonymously.) For a person to avoid akrasia, therefore, all the premises in the prohibitive syllogism need be active. When that is not the case and all the premises in the permissive syllogism are active, one commits akrasia. 
	Let us begin by looking at Aquinas’s theological treatises in which fornication is the sample akratic activity. The universal premise in the sample prohibitive syllogism (Uproh) is “No fornication is to be committed.”​[7]​ The universal premise in the competing permissive syllogism in these cases (Uperm) is “[Every] pleasure ought to be pursued.”​[8]​ Ex hypothesi, both universal premises are being used.​[9]​ On account of concupiscence, however, the akratic does not use the particular premise relevant to Uproh, (call it “PPproh”), “This is fornication,” but instead uses the particular premise relevant to Uperm, (call it “PPperm”), “This is a pleasurable thing.” The result is that the agent fails to draw the prohibitive conclusion (“This is not to be committed”) and instead draws and uses the permissive akratic conclusion “This thing ought to be pursued.” She thus acts akratically. This can be diagrammed as follows, with active premises italicized.
[Diag 1]​[10]​
Uproh: No fornication is to be committed	Uperm: [Every] pleasure ought to be pursued 
PPproh: This is fornication			PPperm: This is a pleasurable thing
Conclproh: This is not to be committed	Conclperm: This thing ought to be pursued
	We now turn to SLE and Aristotle’s own description of the akratic taster of sweets. As Aquinas rightly points out, Aristotle’s Uperm has the form “Every sweet is pleasurable.” The relevant Uproh, however, is more problematic. Infamously, Aristotle does not specify its form. He simply states that there is “the universal belief hindering one from tasting.”​[11]​ Since the akratic action consists of tasting a sweet, this line may lead one to render Uproh as “Sweets should not be tasted.” This rendering, however, yields a problem. Not only is it clear from the text that the akratic used both Uproh and Uperm,​[12]​ but Aristotle’s akratic also uses the particular premise “This is sweet.” This premise, moreover, is relevant to both universals; it can fill the role of both PPproh and PPperm. Since it does, both syllogisms should go through to their conclusions. They can be diagrammed as follows:​[13]​
[Diag 2]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted		Uperm: Every sweet is pleasurable 
PPproh & PPperm: 			This is sweet						
Conclproh: This should not be tasted		Conclperm: This is pleasurable
For akrasia to occur, however, Conclproh presumably should not be arrived at since akrasia is due to a failure of practical reasoning with regard to the prohibitive syllogism. 
	Aquinas famously and ingeniously solves this dilemma by seizing upon the fact that Aristotle failed to specify the form of Uproh. Instead of the simple “Sweets should not be tasted,” Aquinas posits that the prohibiting universal expresses something akin to the fact that sweets should not be tasted inordinately and gives as an example “No sweet ought to be tasted extra horam.” The phrase extra horam literally means “outside the hour” and is often taken to mean a time at which sweets supposedly should not be tasted, such as between meals.​[14]​ We need not be too concerned with the exact meaning, and I will leave it untranslated. The important point to note is that, by adding extra horam, Aquinas has “complexified” (to coin a term) Uproh. Whereas there was only one important universal concept (fornication) contained in Uproh in the theological works, two are contained in SLE’s Uproh: the universal concept of sweetness, and a time-related universal concept.​[15]​ For the prohibitive syllogism to go through to its conclusion, therefore, having the particular premise “This is sweet” would not be enough; an agent would also have to know that the current time is extra horam. If the agent lacks this latter knowledge, then the prohibitive syllogism can fail while the agent can complete the permissive one up to its conclusion.
	The fact that a universal proposition can contain two universal concepts leads to a further difference between the two treatments, a difference with regard to particular premises. In Aquinas’s theological works, only one particular premise is needed to successfully complete the prohibitive syllogism, namely: “This is fornication.” The inclusion of a complexified Uproh in SLE, however, demands that two particular premises be used for the prohibitive syllogism to be successful; the agent would have to actively know both that “This is a sweet” and “This is extra horam.” Failure to use either PP would lead to failure of the prohibitive syllogism.​[16]​ In Aquinas’s mind, therefore, the act of Aristotle’s akratic can be explained thusly:​[17]​ 
[Diag 3]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted extra horam		Uperm: Every sweet is pleasurable 
PPproh1: It is currently extra horam		 		PPproh2 & PPperm: This is sweet	
Conclproh: This should not be tasted				Conclperm: This is pleasurable
	We have thus far noticed three interrelated differences between the two treatments. In SLE, Uproh is complexified whereas it is not in the theological works. This complexification, moreover, requires the use of two different PPproh’s to complete the prohibitive syllogism in SLE whereas only one PPproh is necessary to complete the prohibitive syllogism in the theological texts. Both of these differences are, in turn, ultimately the result of a third difference: in the SLE, the universal premises share a universal term (“sweet”) whereas they do not in the theological works (“fornication” as opposed to “pleasure”). This leads us to search for a rationale that explains why Aquinas did not follow the model of SLE in his theological works and phrase the universal premises in such a way that they share a universal term. Why, in other words, is not the form of Uperm “[Every] act of fornication is pleasurable” instead of “Every pleasure ought to be pursued”? Such a Uperm would be expected given that the supposed akratic act would be to engage in, and the competing Uproh would intend to prohibit, fornication specifically. 
	In response, I posit that the reason Aquinas did not follow SLE’s model lies in the nature of the akratic act under question here in the theological works. Consider first what it would look like if Uperm in the theological texts were “[Every] act of fornication is pleasurable.”
[Diag 4]
Uproh: No fornication is to be committed	Uperm: [Every] act of fornication is pleasurable 
				PPproh & PPperm: This is fornication				
Conclproh: This is not to be committed	Conclperm: This is pleasurable
	Given the assumption that both universal premises are being used,​[18]​ then both the prohibitive and permissive syllogisms would succeed once one actively knew “This is fornication”; there would be no way for the permissive syllogism to succeed while the prohibitive one fails. Moreover, since Conclproh is imperative while Conclperm is not, the imperative prohibition would presumably rule action. The agent using the PP that “This is fornication” would consequently think that although this act would be pleasurable, it is not to be committed. The possibility of akrasia with regard to fornication would thereby be ruled out.
	It might be initially thought that this problem could be solved by employing a strategy similar to that used in SLE (cf. Diag 3)--namely, by adding a second universal concept to Uproh. As it turns out, however, this strategy is not available to Aquinas with regard to this particular Uproh. “No fornication is to be committed” is an absolute and categorical prohibition in Aquinas’s mind, not apt to be modified by “inordinately” or some other qualification. There is not a proper, temperate way in which to fornicate.​[19]​ Uproh thus cannot be complexified such that an additional particular premise would be required for the prohibitive syllogism to succeed as was the case in SLE and Diag 3. 
	We hereby come to a rationale that explains the above-noted three differences between the two treatments. The general act under question in the theological texts is a categorically prohibited act. Since categorically prohibited acts are not apt to be modified, Uproh’s associated with them cannot be complexified. This has the further result that these Uproh’s ought not share a universal concept with Uperm and the related prohibitive syllogisms can be completed with only one particular premise. By contrast, the act under question in SLE (tasting sweets) is not categorically prohibited. Uproh’s with regard to such acts can share universal concepts with the related Uperm. In such cases, the Uproh’s must be complexified so as to make akrasia theoretically possible, and a second PP is required so as to complete the prohibitive syllogism.​[20]​ There is thus a clear explanation as to why the theological works differ in these ways from the SLE and do not include the innovative moves of the latter.
	Having discussed and given a rationale for the aforementioned three related differences,​[21]​ we now turn to yet another way in which the two treatments significantly differ: the imperative or non-imperative nature of the Uperm’s and the permissive syllogisms. The Uperm in the theological works is imperative (cf. Diag 1). Surprisingly, however, SLE’s Uperm is not.​[22]​ Given that the permissive syllogisms are intended as practical syllogisms, it is natural to wonder why the SLE diverges from the theological texts in this respect; a practical syllogism would seem to demand an imperative Uperm if at all possible. As we will see, it turns out not to be possible for SLE’s Uperm to be phrased imperatively. 
	As a quick answer to why SLE’s Uperm is not imperative, one could simply presume it is not because Aristotle’s own Uperm is not. There is, however, more to the story than that. To see this, let us begin with a variation of Diag 2 (i.e. before Aquinas’s innovation of adding extra horam to Uproh) in which we consider what the permissive syllogism would look like if SLE’s Uperm were imperative. 
[Diag 5]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted		Uperm: Every sweet is to be pursued
PPproh & PPperm: 			This is sweet						
Conclproh: This should not be tasted		Conclperm: This is to be pursued
	The agent using both universals (as the akratic in view supposedly does) and the lone PP would arrive at contradictory practical injunctions. This would seem, on its face, to make either action impossible. At any rate, it is not clear that by this description we would have a clear explanation as to why an agent acted akratically.
	The problem, of course, is that the permissive universal premise and conclusion are directly opposed to their counterparts in the prohibitive syllogism by simultaneously making affirmations and denials in reference to the same universal concept, “sweetness.” Such, according to Aristotle, cannot happen: one’s reason can never be directly contradictory to itself.​[23]​ Aquinas emphatically agrees when he glosses that in the akratic the “contrariety is not from the side of reason per se as happens in those who are wavering.” ​[24]​ For action to occur, one’s practical reasoning cannot result in a contradiction. Such a contradiction, however, is inevitable in Diag 5. 
	To avoid this contradiction while maintaining the imperative nature of Uperm, we might “complexify” it by adding, say, in hora (“at an appropriate time”). This would, of course, require the relevancy of a further PPperm, “It is currently in hora.” Along similar lines, if tasting sweets is ever to be allowed and non-akratic, then the current Uproh is problematic in its unqualified, absolute prohibition against tasting sweets. It thus ought to be “complexified” in some way similar to that which Aquinas proposed. This would then yield the following:
[Diag 6]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted extra horam	Uperm: Every sweet is to be pursued in hora
PPproh: It is currently extra horam; PPproh & PPperm: This is sweet; PPperm: It is currently in hora 
Conclproh: This should not be tasted			Conclperm: This is to be pursued
	While doing this maintains the imperative nature of Uperm, it does so at a cost: akrasia is ruled out! For the agent to akratically taste sweets, she must arrive at Conclperm and taste them at a time or in a way forbidden by Uproh and the prohibitive syllogism, which would be at a time either extra horam or not in hora.​[25]​ But she could only arrive at Conclperm by using PPperm “It is currently in hora.” This PP, moreover, could only be being used at a time when either it really was in hora or the agent at least believed it was in hora. In either case, the agent’s tasting the sweet would not count as akratic. 
	We hereby have an explanation of why the SLE’s permissive syllogism is not imperative: it cannot be! For it to be imperative, it would have to be complexified. Such complexification, however, along with the use of an additional PP associated with that complexification, rules out the possibility of acting akratically. The permissive phrasing of SLE’s Uperm (cf. Diag 3) thus seems required to make the akratic tasting of sweets possible. It makes possible that an agent can actively conclude that “This is pleasurable” without, at the same time, arriving at Conclproh. Given the lack of an active prohibition, it is natural that a person would pursue that which she has recognized as pleasurable.​[26]​ 
	There is one further option by which we could attempt to phrase SLE’s permissive syllogism in an imperative way. Taking a clue from the permissive syllogism in the theological works, we could perhaps construct the akratic’s reasoning by means of a more complex syllogistic structure in which there are two Uperm’s.
[Diag 7]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted extra horam 	Uperm1: Pleasure ought to be pursued
PPproh: It is currently extra horam		 	Uperm2: Sweets are pleasures
			PPproh & PPperm: This is sweet						 
Conclproh: This should not be tasted			Conclperm: This is to be pursued
	At first glance, Diag 7 seems to have been what Aquinas should have said about the form of the permissive syllogism in SLE. In doing so, he would have been following the form of his theological works, ensuring that the permissive syllogism is practical by making it imperative, maintaining the active status of the universal premises, and offering an explanation of how one could arrive at Conclperm without arriving at Conclproh.
	Despite these advantages, a significant problem remains: it would be impossible to be enkratic according to this description, a possibility both Aquinas and Aristotle affirm. The enkratic (or “continent”) is one who is not fully virtuous because, like the akratic, she is tempted by the passions to sin. Unlike the akratic, however, the enkratic resists those temptations and acts in accordance with the prohibitive syllogism.​[27]​ If the enkratic’s action were to be explained in syllogistic form analogous to that of the akratic’s, it would follow that she would draw Conclproh without, at the same time, drawing Conclperm. ​[28]​ Doing so, though, would not be possible if the syllogism in Diag 7 were to obtain. In order to draw Conclproh, the PP “This is sweet” would have to be active.​[29]​ This PP, however, also completes the permissive syllogism. The result would be the same two directly conflicting active practical maxims that were problematic in Diag 5 (i.e. “This should not be tasted” and “This is to be pursued”). And as we observed with reference to Diag 5, no action (including in this case a decisive choice of the enkratic act) can result when one’s practical reasoning results in such a contradiction. Diag 7 is hence problematic because it would rule out enkrasia. 
	The possibility of enkratic action in Diag 7 might be preserved by positing that either Uperm1 or Uperm2 is not active. In such a case, an enkratic agent could still use “This is sweet” without arriving at Conclperm. This strategy, however, is unfulfilling in the present case. Although it is no doubt possible that one of these two universal premises could fail to be active for an enkratic, both these premises have been listed variously as the type of universal premise the akratic has. If we assume the enkratic uses the same universal premises as the akratic but does not complete the permissive syllogism because of using a different particular premise, it is ad hoc at best to deny that he is using either of these two universal premises. Consequently, there seems to be no way the make SLE’s permissive syllogism imperative. 
	Given the difficulty of constructing a satisfactory imperative permissive syllogism in SLE, it may be wondered how Aquinas was able to posit one in the theological works (cf. Diag 1). The answer lies in the fact that, just as it is impossible that SLE’s permissive syllogism take an imperative form, it is likewise impossible that the permissive syllogism in the theological works be phrased non-imperatively. Indeed, we have already demonstrated above (Diag 4) the latter point. There, it was shown that if the permissive syllogism were non-imperative along the lines of SLE, the agent under question could not arrive at Conclperm, “This is pleasurable” without at the same time arriving at Conclproh, “This is not to be committed.” Given, moreover, that the former does not directly contradict the latter’s explicit prohibition, it was concluded that no akrasia could occur. 
	We thus arrive at an initial understanding of why the permissive syllogisms of the two accounts differ with regard to their imperative natures: in either case, the permissive syllogisms cannot be phrased with a different imperative nature because doing so would compromise the ability to explain either akratic or enkratic behavior. What remains to be discovered is the factor that accounts for this difference. What explains the fact that in one case a permissive syllogism cannot be phrased imperatively while, in the other, it cannot be phrased non-imperatively? 
	The answer lies once again in the nature of the sample akratic act. Recall that in Diag 4 the impossibility of phrasing the permissive syllogism non-imperatively was a function of the fact that the act under question was such as to be categorically prohibited. The non-imperative phrasing of a Uperm regarding a categorically proscribed act entailed that that there would be only one relevant PP which, if used at all, would complete both syllogisms, leaving akrasia unexplained.​[30]​ There was thus no acceptable way to formulate non-imperative permissive syllogisms with regard to categorically prohibited acts such as the one under question in the theological works. The case, however, is the opposite with regard to sample akratic acts that are not apt to be categorically prohibited. They must be phrased non-imperatively; otherwise, we encounter problems such as those seen in Diag 5 and Diag 6.
	We can conclude, therefore, that Aquinas’s variation between positing imperative and non-imperative permissive syllogisms is a function of whether the act in question is categorically or conditionally proscribed. In the latter case, permissive imperative syllogisms cannot be formulated, while in the former non-imperative permissive syllogisms face problems. Note moreover that the rationale for the difference in the imperative nature of the permissive syllogisms is the same rationale as that for the other three related differences focused upon at the beginning of this paper: the form of the prohibitive universal premise, the number of PP’s required to complete the prohibitive syllogism, and the sharing or non-sharing by universal premises of a universal term. 
	In summary, it has been shown that categorically proscribed acts require that the permissive syllogism be imperative, the Uproh not be complexified, the non-sharing of a universal term, and the use of only one PP to complete the prohibitive syllogism. Conditionally proscribed acts, by contrast, entail a non-imperative permissive syllogism, a complexified Uproh, the sharing of a universal term, and the use of more than one PP to complete the prohibitive syllogism. Consequently, a consistent rationale (the categorical or conditional nature of the akratic act under question) that explains the various differences between the SLE has been discovered. This discovery, in turn, provides indirect support for the claim that the SLE may be consistent with Aquinas’s theological works. As such, it is possible that it ought to be consulted in order to have a complete understanding of Aquinas’s views on akrasia and other topics. 
Part II

	The final difference between the two treatments lies in a discussion of which premises are and are not active during akrasia. This disparity will turn out to be less problematic than may at first appear. The resolution of this disparity, moreover, will lead us to form a significant hypothesis regarding the so-called “weak” akratic’s use of Conclproh, a hypothesis supported by statements in both SLE and the theological works. There will thus be additional support for the claim that SLE ought not necessarily be relegated as merely repetitive of Aristotle and non-expressive of Aquinas’s own views. 
	As has already been pointed out, it seems axiomatic that, for Thomas, the akratic is using Uproh. Repeated mention of the “four propositions,” included in both treatments, implies the akratic is using Uproh.​[31]​ Moreover, the entire focus in SLE 7.3 is on how reasoning goes wrong at the level of the PP, not at the level of the universal premise. In the midst of discussing how practical reasoning can fail in general,​[32]​ he assumes that the “universal considered in and of itself” (i.e. the universal premise) is active.​[33]​ During the discussion in which he complexifies Uproh he seems to go out of his way to state that passion is not interfering with knowledge of the universal premise and that reason is proposing the prohibitive universal premise.​[34]​ All indications, therefore, point to the fact that the failure in akrasia is a failure at the level of PPproh, not that of Uproh.
	Given this emphasis on the active status of Uproh, it is initially surprising when one reads parallel passages in the theological works noting that failure in akrasia can occur because either PPproh or Uproh is not active: “it can well happen that somebody should have correct knowledge habitually regarding an affirmative universal premise, and an active false opinion regarding a particular negative.”​[35]​ It appears that in the theological works Aquinas holds open the possibility that the akratic can fail to draw Conclproh due to Uproh being present only habitually and not actively. Is there a way this can be reconciled with the SLE 7.3’s neglect to discuss failure at the level of Uproh and detailed focus upon akratic reasoning failing at the level of the PP?
	The solution lies in recognizing that there are two different types of akratic: the weak and the impetuous. The focus in this paper so far has been on the weak akratic--the akratic who performs some sort of deliberation regarding her act and ultimately, because of a failure to properly deliberate, acts akratically against an active Uproh. The impetuous akratic, by contrast, “jumps into” the akratic act so quickly she never has time to think or deliberate about her action. She knows (habitually) that her act is wrong, but acts so quickly that she does not think about it at the time.​[36]​ The discrepancy under question disappears once we assume that the passages regarding failure at the level of the Uproh in the theological works are intended to refer to the impetuous akratic. This is reasonable to assume since an impetuous akratic acts so quickly that she does not think about her action being prohibited in universal terms (i.e. her Uproh is not active). Meanwhile, it is clear that SLE 7.3 is concerned with explaining the weak akratic’s action and how her deliberation begins, and even begins properly (by using Uproh) and nonetheless subsequently fails.​[37]​
	Consideration of the two types of akratics leads to an important point regarding blameworthiness and a subsequent inference that can be derived from both SLE and the theological works. Commenting on EN 7.8, Aquinas follows Aristotle by stating that the weak incontinent is worse than the impetuous one.​[38]​ Aristotle’s reason, which Aquinas follows, is that the weak “are not lacking in having been counseled.”​[39]​ Apparently, the presence of some prior counsel, which the weak incontinent fail to stick to, accounts for them being more blameworthy than the impetuous akratic who have no counsel.
	Given this, let us quickly reconsider the weak akratic in SLE 7.3. If the prohibitive syllogism failed at PPproh, then she never arrived at Conclproh. If she never arrived at Conclproh, however, then it is unclear how any “deliberation” she performed should make her more blameworthy than the impetuous akratic. It is not clear how she can be regarded has having had any counsel in the first place if she never actively used PPproh and Conclproh. I propose that the only way to make sense of the explanation for the weak akratic’s greater blameworthiness is to presume that, for Aquinas, the weak akratic did indeed, at some point relevantly close to akratic act in question, deliberate and arrive at Conclproh. Having arrived at that deliberative decision and having, for the time being, not acted akratically, she subsequently failed to use PPproh (even though Uproh may have remained active). It was only at this latter point at which Conclproh failed to be active and akrasia occurred. In other words, I am hypothesizing that the weak akratic did indeed draw the correct conclusion and subsequently forgot it.​[40]​
	Note that if this suggested interpretation of the weak akratic is not adopted, then it would follow that the weak akratic did not actively know (at a relevantly proximate time) that she should not be doing what she is doing.​[41]​ We pre-reflectively assume, however, that a weak akratic did indeed actively know at some time relevantly close to the action in question that she should not do what she is doing. The suggested interpretation buttresses this assumption. Note furthermore that the present suggestion of the structure of weak akrasia is (in Aristotle’s words) sort of “like that which Socrates was seeking to bring about”​[42]​ in that the weak agent must be temporarily forgetting that which she actively knows.​[43]​ Finally, and more importantly for our purposes, such a proposal seems to fit with different statements Aquinas makes in both SLE and the theological works. He states, for example, in SLE 7.7 that weak akratics “do not remain in those things which they were counseled.”​[44]​ Again, he describes how the weak “have rational counsel but do not remain in it.”​[45]​ Similar things are said in the theological works. In ST IIa-IIae, q.156, a.1 Aquinas describes the incontinent as one who does not “remain in those things which have been counseled, because he was weakly established in that which reason judged (judicavit).​[46]​ The use of the perfect judicavit implies that reason already made and completed some judgment. The most natural way to read this would be to believe it referred to reason having had, at an earlier point, arrived at Conclproh.












Uproh: No fornication is to be committed	Uperm: [Every] pleasure ought to be pursued 
PPproh: This is fornication			PPperm: This is a pleasurable thing
Conclproh: This is not to be committed	Conclperm: This thing ought to be pursued
[Diag 2]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted		Uperm: Every sweet is pleasurable 
PPproh & PPperm: 			This is sweet						
Conclproh: This should not be tasted	Conclperm: This is pleasurable
[Diag 3]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted extra horam		Uperm: Every sweet is pleasurable 
PPproh1: It is currently extra horam		 		PPproh2 & PPperm: This is sweet	
Conclproh: This should not be tasted				Conclperm: This is pleasurable
[Diag 4]
Uproh: No fornication is to be committed	Uperm: [Every] act of fornication is pleasurable 
				PPproh & PPperm: This is fornication				
Conclproh: This is not to be committed	Conclperm: This is pleasurable
[Diag 5]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted		Uperm: Every sweet is to be pursued
PPproh & PPperm: 			This is sweet						
Conclproh: This should not be tasted			Conclperm: This is to be pursued
[Diag 6]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted extra horam	Uperm: Every sweet is to be pursued in hora
PPproh: It is currently extra horam; PPproh & PPperm: This is sweet; PPperm: It is currently in hora 
Conclproh: This should not be tasted			Conclperm: This is to be pursued
[Diag 7]
Uproh: Sweets should not be tasted extra horam 	Uperm1: Pleasure ought to be pursued
PPproh: It is currently extra horam			Uperm2: Sweets are pleasures
				PPproh & PPperm: This is sweet					















^1	  See, for example, Risto Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 119. This latter text will play a role only near the end of the paper.
^2	  Saarinen, for example, notes that in SLE 7 “Thomas often follows Aristotle’s text closely and does not aim at an original contribution” (Weakness of the Will, 119). Indeed, the claim that Aquinas’s Aristotelian commentaries are meant not to express Aquinas’s own views but are rather simply expositions of Aristotle’s texts has engendered great controversy among scholars of Aquinas. Famously, Etienne Gilson declared that Aquinas’s “commentaries on Aristotle are so many expositions of the doctrine of Aristotle, not of what might be called his own philosophy” [Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), 367]. James Weisheipl seems of the same general view. He writes that, though the commentaries cannot be considered “mere paraphrase,” Aquinas tried to stay true to the words and intention of Aristotle in order to provide exegetical guides to the apostolate. See: James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1974), 280-285. In contemporary times, Mark D. Jordan has perhaps been the main proponent of the claim that Aquinas’s commentaries are not intended to express Aquinas’s own views. His writings on this topic include: Mark D. Jordan, The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson Series 15 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1992); “Thomas Aquinas’ Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Commentaries” in Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, OP, ed. R. James Long (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), 99-112; “Aquinas Reading Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Ad Litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers, ed. Mark D. Jordan and Kent Emery, Jr. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 229-249. As an example, Jordan claims in this latter article that the SLE “is a literal exposition aimed chiefly at making reflective sense of the Aristotelian text” and follows up that sentence with the claim that it is “a literal exposition only” (235). See also his “Thomas as Commentator in Some Programs of Neo-Thomism: A Reply to Kaczor,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78, no. 2 (2004): 379-386. This latter is a response to Kaczor’s opposing view in: Christopher Kaczor, “Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Ethics: Merely an Interpretation of Aristotle?,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78, no. 2 (2004): 353-378. Ralph McInerny states (in opposing R. -A. Gauthier’s view) that Aquinas’s “commentaries on Aristotle are precious aids for understanding the text of Aristotle.” See Ralph McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 163. Joseph Owens argues that the “distinction between ‘personal’ works of Aquinas and commentaries is obvious and has to remain.” Even though the SLE gives “the occasional indication in passing that it is placing the whole consideration in a Christian setting,” Owen writes that “it occupies itself with explaining the text just as the text stands.” See Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., “Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator,” in St. Thomas Aquinas: Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 213-238 (at 238 and 231 respectively). John Jenkins takes a middle road between what he calls “appropriationist” (according to which the commentaries present Aquinas’s own views) and “historicist” (according to which the commentaries are meant only to explain the text of Aristotle) readings of Aquinas’s commentaries. See John Jenkins, C.S.C., “Expositions of the Text: Aquinas’s Aristotelian Commentaries,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996): 39-62. Thomas Stegman notes that Aquinas in general closely follows Aristotle’s text in the SLE with regard to incontinence. He does add, however, that in one paragraph Aquinas diverges from Aristotle’s text in order to suggest a role for the will in akrasia. Interestingly, the paragraph in which Stegman claims that Aquinas diverges from Aristotle is a different part of the passage than that focused upon in this article. Bonnie Kent, incidentally, disputes some of the claims made by Stegman on behalf of Aquinas. See both: Thomas D. Stegman, S.J., “Saint Thomas and the Problem of Akrasia,” The Modern Schoolman 66 (1989): 117-128; and Bonnie Kent, “Aquinas and Weakness of Will,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75, no. 1 (July, 2007): 70-91. Bonnie Kent claims that to understand Aquinas’s views, one must resort to his theological works. She also adds that there are differences between those works and the SLE with regard to incontinence. Nonetheless, she concludes that the two accounts are compatible with one another; the SLE simply does not give as full an analysis of Thomas’s view of akrasia as do the theological works. See both: Bonnie Kent, “Transitory Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27, no. 2 (1989): 199-223; Bonnie Kent, Virtues of the Will (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1995). See also James C. Doig, Aquinas’s Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics: A Historical Perspective (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer, 2001) for a thorough discussion of many issues surrounding the SLE.
^3	  It can thus be said that, in some ways, my article is consistent with Kent’s (“Transitory Vice” and Virtues) analysis. Namely, I will propose a way in which to understand as compatible the divergent treatments of akrasia in SLE and the theological works. 
^4	  Nearly all commentators on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 7.3 (1146b31-1147b19) deny that Aristotle’s akratic reaches the conclusion of the prohibitive syllogism. See, for example, Justin Gosling, Weakness of Will (New York: Routledge, 1990), chap. 3. For the contrary, minority view, see the following: N.O. Dahl, Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of Will (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984); David Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); and my The Problem of Negligent Omissions: Medieval Action Theories to the Rescue (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, forthcoming), chap. 2. 
^5	  Cf. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 7.3 (1146b34-36). 
^6	  I say “proposition” instead of “premise” because the syllogism’s conclusion, when expressed in a propositional form, can itself be either active or inactive and it will be necessary to make reference to this distinction with regard to the conclusion. 
^7	  “Ad quartum dicendum quod ille qui habet scientiam in universali, propter passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere, et ad conclusionem pervenire, sed assumit sub alia universali, quam suggerit inclinatio passionis, et sub ea concludit. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod syllogismus incontinentis habet quatuor propositiones, duas universales, quarum una est rationis, puta nullam fornicationem esse committendam; alia est passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat rationem ne assumat et concludat sub prima, unde, ea durante, assumit et concludit sub secunda” (ST Ia-IIae, q.77, a.2, ad.4). All Latin is from the Leonine edition, located at: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are mine. A parallel passage can be found at DM q.3, a.9, ad.7. In this latter passage, there is a slight difference in that the prohibitive universal is “No sin is to be done” with an accompanying particular premise of “This is sin.” So far as I can tell, nothing in particular with regard to the purposes of this paper depends upon this distinction. For simplicity’s sake, I will follow the ST account. 
^8	  I place “every” in brackets because “omne” precedes pleasure in the DM account; it is lacking in ST. Again, there does not seem to be much at stake in this difference. 
^9	  That this is the case is clear from both the texts of DM q.3, a.9 ad.7 and ST Ia-IIae q.77, a.2, ad.4. In both cases, Aquinas speaks of Aristotle referring to “four propositions” which the akratic uses in reasoning, two of which are the competing universals. The other two, as is about to be shown, are the permissive particular premise and the permissive conclusion. 
^10	  An appendix conveniently listing all syllogisms used in this paper is included at the end of the text.
^11	  EN 7.3 (1147a32), translation mine.
^12	  Aquinas clearly seems to agree that both universal premises are active. Since the ultimate action under view is akratic, Uperm is clearly active. With regard to Uproh he writes that “in the incontinent reason is not totally obstructed by concupiscence such that the akratic does not have true opinion [of Uproh].” The entire focus of the passage, moreover, is on how the reasoning goes wrong only at the level of the particular premise in virtue of it, and not the universal premise, being inactive. Cf. for example, SLE 7.3, n.12-14. Furthermore, there is (as there is in the theological texts) appeal to the “four propositions” in the akratic’s syllogism, two of which are the two competing universal premises (SLE 7.3, n.20). 
^13	  For a discussion of this problem in Aristotle’s text, see Justin Gosling, Weakness of Will (London & New York: Routledge, 1990), chap. 3.
^14	  “quod in incontinente ratio non totaliter obruitur a concupiscentia quin in universali habeat veram sententiam; sit ergo ita quod ex parte rationis proponatur una universalis prohibens gustare dulce inordinate, puta si dicatur, nullum dulce oportet gustare extra horam, sed ex parte concupiscentiae proponitur quod omne dulce est delectabile, quod est per se quaesitum a concupiscentia. Et quia in particulari concupiscentia ligat rationem, non assumitur sub universali rationis, ut dicatur hoc esse praeter horam; sed assumitur sub universali concupiscentiae, ut dicatur hoc esse dulce. Et ita sequitur conclusio operis; et sunt in hoc syllogismo incontinentis quatuor propositiones, sicut iam dictum est” (SLE 7.3, n.20).
^15	  Note that universal concepts, concepts containing terms that can be applied universally, is not the same as a universal premise. See the following footnote for more explanation.
^16	  Of course, failure to know “This is sweet” would, in this case, lead to a similar failure of the permissive syllogism and, thus, of the akratic act. Note that there is some support in Aristotle’s text for regarding a universal premise as composed of two concepts and accordingly demanding the presence of two particular premises. He does this when he says that there are “different types of universal.” To understand this statement, we must first discuss what Aristotle means here by “universal.” He is not referring to universal premises. Instead, as Terry Irwin notes, he is referring to a distinction between different kinds of universal concepts. There is, on the one hand, a concept related to an object (such as “dryness”) and a concept related to the agent (such as being a “human being”). These two universal concepts are represented both in a complex universal proposition and in two separate particular premises. This leads to his giving as an example of practical reasoning the complex universal premise “Dry things benefit every human being” with relevant particular premises being “This sort of thing is dry” and “he himself is a human being” (EN 7.3, 1147a4-5). [For a defense of this reading of Aristotle, refer to: Terry Irwin (ed. and trans.), Aristotle; Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1999), 258. Terry Irwin and Gail Fine make this clear by the structure they give their translation of this passage in: Aristotle, Introductory Readings, trans. Terence Irwin and Gail Fine. (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1996).] Ironically, Aquinas notes this distinction between different types of “universals” but indicates that he takes it not as a distinction between different kinds of universal concepts; instead, he takes it as the distinction regarding how a single universal concept can be used in both the universal and particular premises, as “fornication” is in both Uproh and Uperm (cf. SLE 7.3, n.13). Nonetheless, Aquinas’s addition of a second concept in his Uproh (which, in turn, requires an additional particular premise for the prohibitive syllogism to be successful) is consistent with Aristotle’s general approach.
^17	  See Gosling, chap. 3 for a similar description of Aquinas’s strategy in this respect.
^18	  This, as stated above, is the general assumption throughout these texts. 
^19	  One is reminded of Aristotle’s saying that some things, such as adultery, are not apt to be done correctly by being done moderately (EN 2.6, 1107a10-20). Bonnie Kent brings attention to the categorical nature of the prohibitions in the theological works. See, for example, “Transitory Vice,” 211-212 and Virtues, 165-166. 
^20	  Of course, it only makes sense that Uproh’s with regard to acts that are not categorically prohibited ought to be complexified precisely because such acts are prohibited not categorically but only under certain conditions.
^21	  For simplicity’s sake, these three are stated again: a complexified vs. non-complexified Uproh, the sharing versus non-sharing by universal premises of a universal term, and the need for two, as opposed to one, PP’s to complete the prohibitive syllogism.
^22	  Cf. Diag 3. Risto Saarinen briefly points out this difference (Weakness of the Will, 128).
^23	  “Therefore suppose that on the one hand there is the universal belief hindering one from tasting, and on the other hand the belief that everything sweet is pleasant, and that this is sweet (and this latter belief is active), and appetite is present in the situation. Therefore, on the one hand the belief says to flee this, but on the other hand appetite leads one on (for it is capable of moving each of the parts). Hence it comes to pass that one acts akratically in a certain way because of reason and belief. The [second] belief is not contrary to correct reason in itself, but coincidentally [or, according to coincidence] (for the appetite is opposite to correct reason, but not the [second] belief)” (EN 7.3, 1147a32-b4).
^24	  “Deinde cum dicit: non contrarie autem etc., ostendit causam praedictae repugnantiae. Et dicit, quod non est ibi contrarietas ex parte rationis per se, sicut accidit in dubitantibus, sed solum per accidens, inquantum scilicet concupiscentia contrariatur universali rationi rectae. Non autem aliqua opinio per se contrariatur rectae rationi, sicut quidam dicebant” (SLE 7.3, n.22).
^25	  Note that this result depends in no way upon the addition of extra horam to Uproh; the same problem would arise without its presence.
^26	  For a quick discussion of this latter claim with regard to Aristotle’s text, see: Martin Pickavé and Jennifer Whiting, “Nicomachean Ethics 7.3 on Akratic Ignorance,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34 (2008): 323-371 at 355.
^27	  Cf. ST IIa-IIae, q.155; EN 4.9 (1128b30-36); EN 7.9 (1151a30ff.) 
^28	  The enkratic is the converse of the akratic, the latter of whom supposedly draws Conclperm without arriving at Conclproh.
^29	  Of course, the PPproh “It is currently extra horam” would also be active.
^30	  This assumes, of course, that both universals are being used. This assumption is supported by Aquinas repeated reference to the “four propositions.”
^31	  Cf. SLE 7.3, n.20 for its presence in SLE. 
^32	  “Sciendum tamen quod dupliciter potest accipi universale. Uno quidem modo prout est in seipso: puta si dicamus quod omni homini conferunt sicca. Alio modo secundum quod est in re singulari, puta si dicamus quod iste est homo vel talis cibus est siccus; potest ergo contingere quod aliquis sciat et in habitu et in actu universale secundum se consideratum; sed universale consideratum in hoc singulari vel non habet, idest in habitu non cognoscit, vel non operatur, id est non cognoscit in actu” (SLE 7.3, n.13, italics not mine).
^33	  Note that this is the passage in which I believe Aquinas has slightly misread Aristotle’s original text (cf. footnote 16 above). Nothing of importance hinges, however, on this fact. The important point, so far as the present point is concerned, is that Aquinas makes clear how he understands the passage and, in his understanding, the universal premise is active.
^34	  SLE 7.3, n.20.
^35	  “Ad tertium dicendum quod non posset contingere quod aliquis haberet simul in actu scientiam aut opinionem veram de universali affirmativo, et opinionem falsam de particulari negativo, aut e converso. Sed bene potest contingere quod aliquis habeat veram scientiam habitualiter de universali affirmativo, et falsam opinionem in actu de particulari negativo, actus enim directe non contrariatur habitui, sed actui” (ST Ia-IIae, q.77, a.2, ad.3, italics mine). The parallel passage is found in DM q.9, a.3, ad.5.
^36	  In her failure to think before she acts, the impetuous akratic performs an archetypal negligent omission, a topic I have treated elsewhere at length.
^37	  Bonnie Kent (“Aquinas and Weakness of Will”) discusses some of the similarities and differences between the weak and impetuous akratics.
^38	  1151a1-5.
^39	  “Deinde cum dicit: ipsorum autem etc., comparat species incontinentiae adinvicem. Et dicit quod inter incontinentes, meliores, idest minus mali, sunt excessivi, idest praevolantes, quam debiles qui habent quidem rationem consiliantem sed non permanent in ea. Duplici autem ratione sunt peiores debiles. Primo quidem, quia vincuntur a minori passione. Nam praevolantes vincuntur a passione excedente, vel secundum velocitatem vel secundum vehementiam. Et secundum hanc rationem supra probavit quod intemperatus est peior incontinente. Quae potest esse quarta ratio adiuncta tribus praedictis. Secunda ratio est, quia debiles non sunt impraeconsiliati, sicut alii, idest praevolantes. Et haec ratio supra inducebatur de incontinente et intemperato, quasi incontinens esset praeconsiliatus, non autem intemperatus. Et hoc est falsum, quia etiam intemperatus praeconsiliatus est, peccat enim ex electione, et ideo videtur hic hoc inducere ad ostendendum quod ibi locum non habet” (SLE 7.8, n.5).
^40	  Bonnie Kent has made a similar point in “Transitory Vice,” 221-222.
^41	  Of course, the adulterer may have actively known at some point last year that she should not commit adultery. I take it, however, that active knowledge that is temporally prior to a significant extent is not relevant to the question of akrasia; instead, the explanation of akrasia is concerned with the status of one’s knowledge during some time period relevantly close to the akratic act in question. Discussing what counts as a relevantly close time period is a separate question outside the scope of this particular project. For a more thorough discussion, see my Negligent Omissions.
^42	  EN 7.3, 1147b15.
^43	  It may be granted that this particular aspect does not necessarily fit our experience, thus explaining the unpopularity of Socrates’s view. Nonetheless, Aristotle (upon whom Aquinas was commenting in SLE) sees his view as, in some way, sort of like Socrates’s. Exactly in which was it is or is not like Socrates is a matter of dispute. See, for example, chap. 4 of Justin Gosling’s Weakness of Will entitled “How Socratic is Aristotle?”
^44	  “Secundo ibi: hi quidem enim etc., exponit membra divisionis. Et dicit quod quidam incontinentes sunt qui superveniente concupiscentia consiliantur quidem, sed non permanent in his quae consiliati sunt, propter passionem a qua vincuntur. Et talis incontinentia dicitur debilitas. Quidam vero ducuntur a passione propter hoc quod non consiliantur, sed statim concupiscentia superveniente eam sequuntur. Et haec incontinentia dicitur praevolatio, propter sui velocitatem qua anticipat consilium. Si autem consiliarentur, non ducerentur a passione” (SLE 7.7, n.16, italics mine).
^45	  SLE 7.8, n.5. See also SLE 7.10, n.12
^46	  “Alio modo, quando non permanent homo in his quae consiliata sunt, eo quod debiliter est firmatus in eo quod ratio judicavit” (italics mine).
^47	  Special thanks to Colleen McCluskey, Michael Rota, Trent Dougherty, John Zeis, Zachary Mills, attendees at the “Western New York Regional Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association” in October, 2008, and an anonymous referee, all of whom provided valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper.
